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Abstract 
 
In the European Union the legislature has, in the past years, established an increasing 
number of agencies, granting them increasingly important powers. This phenomenon of 
agencification is legally problematic because it does not have a legal basis in the EU 
Treaties. In order to better understand the challenges posed by EU agencification, this 
Article looks at similar agencification processes in two other federal-type polities, the U.S. 
and Germany. Germany is especially relevant to understanding the vertical (federal) 
dimension to EU agencification, while the U.S. experience can inform us about the 
horizontal (separation of powers) dimension. This is done by looking at three distinct issues: 
The question of the initial establishment of a new body at the EU (federal) level, the extent 
to which powers can be entrusted to such a body, and the degree to which the decisions 
adopted by such bodies are judicially scrutinized. The Article concludes that EU 
agencification poses a greater risk than agencification in Germany or the US because 
control is partially less well-established (compared to Germany) and because the EU polity 
is much less mature (compared to the U.S.). 
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A.  Introduction 
 
Today, the implementation of most European Union (“EU”) policies would be unimaginable 
without the involvement of EU agencies.
1
 Starting in the 1990’s, the EU legislator has 
increasingly resorted to the agency instrument to secure the proper application of its 
legislation. To understand this process of agencification, guidance is often sought from the 
United States, where the ideal type of the independent agency originated.
2
  However, the 
EU Treaties’ logic governing the implementation of EU legislation shares more of a 
resemblance with that of the German Basic Law. Juxtaposing the U.S. and German 
experiences with agencification should then help in acquiring a fuller understanding of the 
future challenges related to EU agencification. Insights from both Germany and the U.S. 
will therefore be combined, paying attention to (1) the possibility for the federal legislature 
to establish subsidiary bodies removed from the core of the executive, (2) the limits to 
empowering these bodies, and (3) the judicial deference granted to acts of such bodies. 
 
B.  Understanding EU Agencification 
 
Today, the EU legislature has established autonomous EU agencies in most policy fields to 
assist the EU institutions and the Member States. These EU agencies may be defined as 
permanent bodies under EU public law, established by the institutions under secondary 
law, and endowed with their own legal personality.
3
 Following the “Common Approach on 
Decentralized Agencies,” the EU institutions have qualified these bodies as decentralized, 
even if “deconcentration” would better capture the dynamics of EU agencification.
4
 
Agencification can then be described generally as the process whereby an increasing 
number of agencies exercise increasingly important powers.
5
 
 
                                                     
1 For a general discussion of the phenomenon of agencification in the EU legal order, see MERIJN CHAMON, EU 
AGENCIES: LEGAL AND POLITICAL LIMITS TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EU ADMINISTRATION (forthcoming 2016). 
2 See generally Tom Zwart, Independent Regulatory Agencies in the US, in AGENCIES IN EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW 3 (Tom Zwart & Luc Verheij eds., 2003); Hubert Delzangles, L’encadrement des agences américaines de 
régulation, un modèle pour l’Europe ?, in LA LEGISTIQUE DANS LE SYSTEME DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE: QUELLE NOUVELLE 
APPROCHE 163 (Fabienne Peraldi Leneuf & Jacques Normand eds., 2012). 
3
 See Merijn Chamon, The Empowerment of Agencies under the Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: Comment 
on United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (Short-Selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism, 39 
EUR. L. REV. 380, 380 n.1 (2014). 
4 Scott earlier rejected the notion of decentralization to describe EU agencification. See Colin Scott, Agencies for 
European Regulatory Governance: A Regimes Approach, in REGULATION THROUGH AGENCIES IN THE EU: A NEW PARADIGM 
OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 70–71 (Damien Geradin, Rodolphe Muñoz & Nicolas Petit eds., 2005). 
5 See also Tobias Bach & Werner Jann, Des animaux dans un zoo administratif: le changement organisationnel et 
l'autonomie des agences en Allemagne, 76 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES SCIENCES ADMINISTRATIVES 469, 470–71 (2010). 
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EU scholars still debate the driving force behind EU agencification, but a consensus seems 
to be emerging whereby the classic “functionalist” narrative is discarded in favor of a more 
political rationale.
6
 EU agencies are executive bodies that do not fit in the traditional EU 
administration that distinguishes between direct administration—by the Commission or, in 
rare instances, the Council—and indirect administration by the Member States. EU 
agencies are not integrated in the Commission and the internal policy organ of an EU 
agency is dominated by representatives of the Member States. In addition, EU agencies 
rarely exercise an independent executive function. Instead, they are usually involved in 
composite procedures, in which they play a part together with relevant national 
authorities and the Commission. 
  
Still, functional reasons for agencification may be conceived. EU agencification started to 
gain pace following the Single European Act (SEA) and the extension of the EU’s reach to 
an increasing number of policy areas. This resulted in an increased demand at the EU level 
for expertise, begging the question of how the Commission should allocate its scarce 
resources. EU agencies may be a functional solution to this problem, allowing the EU to 
gather expertise
7
 and freeing up the Commission to focus on its core tasks.
8
 However, such 
functional needs do not fully explain agencification because the Treaties themselves 
suggest an alternative to agencification. Article 17 TEU provides that the Commission “shall 
ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions 
pursuant to them.”
9
 If more expertise is required at the EU level, it would seem logical 
under the Treaties to house it within the Commission.  
 
                                                     
6 Daniel Kelemen & Andrew Tarrant, The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy, 34 W. EUR. POL. 922, 923 (2011); 
Mark Thatcher, The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and its Limits: A Comparative Analysis of European 
Delegation, 18 J. EUR. PUB.  POL’Y 790, 791 (2011). 
7 See Giandomenico Majone, The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and Regulatory Institutions in the 
European Union, 3 EIPASCOPE 1, 1–6 (1997). See generally Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, EU Regulatory 
Agencies: What Future do They Have?, in VIEWS OF EUROPEAN LAW FROM THE MOUNTAIN 355 (Mielle Bulterman et al. 
eds., 2009). 
8 See Michaela Wittinger, Europäische Satelliten: Anmerkungen zum Europäischen Agentur(un)wesen und zur 
Vereinbarkeit Europäischer Agenturen mit dem Gemeinschaftsrecht, 42 EUROPARECHT 618, 618 (2008); Isabelle 
Muller-Quoy, L'apparition et le développement des Agences de l'Union européenne, in LES AGENCES DE L'UNION 
EUROPÉENNE: RECHERCHE SUR LES ORGANISMES COMMUNAUTAIRES DÉCENTRALISÉS 17 (Jean-Francois Couzinet ed., 2002); 
Martijn Groenleer, The European Commission and Agencies, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 163 (David Spence ed., 
2006); MICHAEL BERGER, VERTRAGLICH NICHT VORGESEHENE EINRICHTUNGEN DES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS MIT EIGENER 
RECHTSPERSÖNLICHKEIT 89–90  (1999).  
9 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C. 306) Art. 17 [hereinafter TFEU Art. 17]. 
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Using the traditional notions, legislative integration following the SEA requires, in most 
areas, a level of coordination among national authorities, which cannot be properly 
achieved under indirect administration. The Treaties then put forward direct 
administration, but through agencification the Member States have secured a more 
subsidiarity-friendly alternative, escaping the rigid dichotomy of indirect and direct 
administration laid down in the Treaties. 
 
Agencification is not a phenomenon unique to the EU and in order to better understand EU 
agencification, many authors have sought guidance from the U.S. experience.
10
 This may 
prove interesting: Conceptualizing the EU as a federal-type polity allows comparisons with 
genuine federal states to be made. For the EU then, Germany, perhaps more than the U.S., 
would seem an interesting guide, because Germany’s model of Vollzugsföderalismus 
(executive federalism) can be analogized to the EU’s rule of indirect administration, even if 
the Court of Justice has refuted that such analogies could have legal consequences in the 
EU legal order.
11
 
 
C.  Three Fundamental Issues in Agencification 
 
In this Article, agencification in the U.S. and Germany will be looked at from a number of 
perspectives which are also becoming highly relevant to the EU, especially following the 
Court’s ruling in UK v. Parliament and Council  (Short-selling).
12
 The federal competence to 
establish agencies, the limits to empowering agencies, and the question of judicial 
deference to agency decisions are fundamental issues that must be addressed.  While the 
EU legislature has currently established over thirty EU agencies, the EU does not have a 
clear allgemeine Organisationskompetenz allowing the EU institutions to establish 
subsidiary bodies. While the EU Treaties since the Lisbon Treaty do refer to “agencies,” this 
language is only used in a minority of language versions of the Treaties.
13
 Even if, for 
example, the reference to agencies in Article 263 TFEU were to be given legal significance, 
the result would be that the Treaties recognize that EU agencies may adopt legally binding 
acts but fail to detail when agencies should be used and what limits their power.  
 
When it comes to these limits, legal doctrine and the EU institutions have long relied on 
the Meroni doctrine but only recently the Court of Justice confirmed this reliance in Short-
                                                     
10 See sources cited infra note 48. 
11 Case C-359/92, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-3681, para. 38. 
12 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18 [hereinafter Short-selling]. 
13 Apart from the English language version, the Bulgarian, Danish, Estonian, Greek, Gaelic, Slovenian, Slovak, 
Romanian, and Swedish language versions also refer to “agencies.” 
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selling.
14
 The Court also extensively re-interpreted the notion of “purely executive 
powers,” because, in the original Meroni v. High Authority ruling, it held that decisions 
adopted by the delegate authority should be “the result of mere accountancy procedures 
based on objective criteria laid down by the [delegating authority].”
15
 A more flexible 
Meroni doctrine was necessary in Short-selling to allow a useful agencification to continue, 
and this is indeed how the Court ruled, referring to “precisely delineated powers.”
16
  
 
In turn, the question of the degree of judicial deference to EU agencies’ decisions has not 
been seriously discussed. This may be explained by the fact that under the original Meroni 
doctrine, the question of judicial deference does not need to be addressed. Following 
Short-selling, the Court of Justice has confirmed that agencies may exercise policy 
discretion
17
 subject to the agencies’ powers being “amenable to judicial review in the light 
of the objectives established by the delegating authority.”
18
 This raises the question of 
which kind(s) of judicial review the EU Courts should apply. These questions will continue 
and increase following the ruling in Short-selling.
19
 
 
D.  Establishing Subsidiary Executive Bodies Removed from the Core Executive 
 
I.  The United States Experience 
 
In the U.S., the Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of agencies. Instead, 
Article II, Section 1 provides that the “executive power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America,” while Article II, Section 3 provides that the President “shall take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
20
 Article II, Section 2 further provides that 
“principal officers” are nominated by the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
21
 The “inferior officers,” however, may be appointed by the President alone, if 
                                                     
14 See Short-selling, supra note 12. 
15 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, 1957–1958 E.C.R. 133, 153. 
16 See Short-selling, supra note 12,, para. 53. 
17 Even if the Court in Short-selling still confirmed that EU agencies cannot exercise discretionary powers. 
18 See Short-selling, supra note 12, at para. 53. 
19 For a discussion of this case and its possible repercussions, see sources cited infra note 110; Chamon, supra 
note 3. See generally Rob Van Gestel, European Regulatory Agencies Adrift?, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 188 
(2014).  
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.  
21 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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Congress so provides by law.
22
 Placing executive branch responsibility with the President, 
the last sentence of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that it is Congress’ 
responsibility to design the federal government:
23
 “To make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.” 
 
This “necessary and proper” clause has a potentially unlimited scope and permits Congress 
to determine how the powers vested in other federal authorities can be executed.
24
 In 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall noted that “[t]his provision is made in a 
constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs.”
25
 Given that flexibility, independent agencies could appear 
necessary and proper to deliver policy in the current modern society, even if they were not 
foreseen by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. 
 
While Congress’ power to design the federal government has not been contested much, 
the more contentious issue was where the different agencies should be situated in the 
federal government.
26
 While executive and cabinet agencies fall within the executive 
sphere, independent agencies have been described as “a new and headless fourth branch 
of the Government,”
27
 resulting in the seemingly primordial question: Who controls these 
bodies? This question almost equates with the single issue of who may remove an agency 
member from office. In the 1920’s in Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court of the 
                                                     
22 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878) (confirming the distinction between inferior and 
principal offers). A clear definition of the constitutional notion of “inferior officers” is still lacking.  
23 See Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 615 
(2006). 
24 Charles Steele & Jeffrey Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 369 (1987). 
25 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819). 
26 Although there is no general consensus on exact terminology in the U.S., three basic groups of agencies are 
generally distinguished: Cabinet agencies (e.g. the Food and Drug Administration), executive agencies (e.g. the 
Environmental Protection Agency), and independent agencies (e.g. the Federal Trade Commission). See Abraham 
Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 416 (1976); Peter Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583 (1984). 
The cabinet agencies operate under a regular department, whereas the latter two do not. Yet, both the cabinet 
and executive agencies should be situated within the executive branch. 
27 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, Report on the Administrative Management in the 
Government of the United States, U.S. SEN., 29 (1937). 
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United States held that the President, being the head of the executive, is vested with this 
power.
28
  
 
Later, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted that Congress 
could prescribe that the President could only dismiss certain agencies’ principal officers 
“for cause.”
29
 In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court found that the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) exercised both “quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative” duties and that the legislature 
had explicitly refrained from entrusting these duties to the Bureau of Corporations—which 
was part of the Department of Commerce.
30
 Congress could require removal only for cause 
because the precedent of Myers only applied to purely executive officers, and did not 
“include an officer who occupies no place in the executive department, and who exercises 
no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.”
31
 Still, both in 
Humphrey’s Executor and Myers, the nature of the function exercised by the officer 
determined the President’s power of removal.
32
 
 
The importance of the President’s power to remove executive officers was confirmed in 
Bowsher v. Synar, where Congress had reserved the power to remove the Comptroller 
General.
33
 Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion observed: “By placing the 
responsibility for execution of [this] Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal 
only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has 
intruded into the executive function.”
34
 Interestingly, the Court found that the Comptroller 
General was subservient to the Congress, even if he could only be removed “for cause.” 
The Court later acknowledged that it is impossible to speak in terms of “purely executive” 
                                                     
28 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926). 
29 Humphrey's Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). A unified “for cause” standard does not exist. The 
legislator may be more or less specific in its statutes as to the grounds on which an officer may be removed. See 
Kent Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2012). 
30 Humphrey's Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935). 
31 Id. at 628. 
32 Peter Davidson, Chipping Away at the President's Control over His Administration: An Analysis of Morrison v. 
Olson and Beyond, 6 J. L. & POL. 205, 217 (1989). As Davidson remarks, this was further confirmed in Wiener. See 
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
33 However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens rejected the qualification of the Comptroller General’s 
powers as “executive” in nature. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 757 (1986). 
34 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734. As Stack observes, the Reagan administration hoped that the Court would rule the 
President may remove the Comptroller General at will, possibly setting a precedent for other independent 
agencies. See Kevin Stack, Obama's Equivocal Defense of Agency Independence, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 583, 590 
(2010). 
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tasks. Distinguishing between purely executive tasks and other tasks became so difficult 
that in Morrison v. Olson, the Court admitted: “[O]ur present considered view is that the 
determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type 
restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on 
whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”
35
 Instead, “the real question 
is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's 
ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must 
be analyzed in that light.”
36
  
 
The Court further explained that it was not required that the President could remove the 
officers of United States Office of the Independent Counsel at will, because even a “for 
cause” protection allowed the Present to retain sufficient authority over the independent 
counsel.
37
 As Stack observes, Morrison v. Olson had an ambiguous outcome for the Reagan 
Administration which had wanted the Court to strike down “for cause” protections as 
unconstitutional.
38
 Instead, the Court upheld this protection at the same time minimizing 
the difference between the removal at will and removal “for cause.”
39
 
 
The latest ruling in this line of cases is Free Enterprise Fund v. PCBOA.
40
 The PCBOA 
members were appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an 
independent agency, and could only be removed by the SEC “for cause.” In turn, the 
Commissioners of the SEC can only be removed by the President “for cause.” The double 
“for cause” removal provisions then raised the question of whether the President still 
retained meaningful control over the PCBOA members and the enforcement of accounting 
standards. In practical terms, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority and explained 
how the second “for cause” limitation changed the nature of the President’s review and 
prevented him from ensuring the faithful execution of the laws.
41
 The Court further 
strengthened this logic by adding a democracy argument, noting that if the President was 
                                                     
35 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988). 
36 Id. at 691. 
37 Id. at 691–92. 
38 See Stack, supra note 34, at 594. 
39 See id. 
40 See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
41 Id. at 484. 
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incapable of ensuring the law’s execution, the people could not properly pass judgement 
on the President’s functioning.
42
  
 
Justice Breyer, writing the dissenting opinion, noted that the case concerned the 
intersection of two constitutional principles: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
separation of powers doctrine. Justice Breyer refers to the changes in U.S. society since the 
adoption of the Constitution and the exigencies of a modern regulatory state,
43
 further 
noting that, in practice, the President’s power “to get something done” depends on other 
elements than that of the power of removal.
44
 While convincing, it might be said that the 
majority’s argument alludes more directly to a citizen’s gut feeling that executive officers 
who are too far removed from the President would surely try to escape his control if they 
are not out of his control already.
45
  
 
The American experience may inform the EU’s understanding of agencies in two important 
ways: First, the discussion in the U.S. has focused on the control of independent agencies, 
given that the establishment of these bodies by Congress is not contested and neither is 
their empowerment.
46
 Now that the Court of Justice has sanctioned significant 
empowerments to EU agencies, in Short-selling, the question of control over the EU 
agencies will become a priority on the political agenda.
47
 In PCBOA, the Supreme Court 
linked the control issue back to the democratic accountability of the U.S. President, which 
begs the question: Which democratic actor should secure the democratic accountability of 
EU agencies? Second, an important difference between the U.S. and EU systems is how 
federal legislation is applied and enforced. This is fundamental but often ignored in 
comparisons of agencification processes in the U.S. and EU.
48
  
                                                     
42 Id. at 497–498. Huq criticized the Court’s opinion arguing that (1) “control” should not be reduced to the power 
of removal and (2) the link between Presidential control and democratic accountability is not that strong. See Aziz 
Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
43 See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 520. 
44 Id. 
45 Chief Justice Roberts further contemplated the idea of a multiple, rather than a double-layered protection, 
using the metaphor of a matryoshka doll. See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 496. 
46 See infra Part E.I.  
47 See infra Part E.II. 
48 See generally Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the EU Should Learn 
from the American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2004); François van der Mensbrugghe, The Danger of 
Excessive Delegations to Independent Administrative Agencies: The Example of the U.S.A., in EUROPEAN REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 113 (Giacinto Della Cananea ed., 2005); Christian Stoffaës, Network Regulation on a Federal Scale: 
Lessons for Europe from the American Perspective, in EUROPEAN REGULATORY AGENCIES 137 (Giacinto Della Cananea 
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In the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, there are strands of cases related to the separation 
of powers and related to federalism. Both strands may at times come together in a single 
case or at other times be debated under which single strand a case should be situated.
49
 
Generally, the question of delegation of powers to agencies firmly forms part of the 
separation of powers jurisprudence. Simply put, in the U.S., a decision by Congress to grant 
powers to an independent agency is an exclusively federal affair. Such a decision may be 
contested for not being “necessary and proper,” or because it “impedes the President's 
ability to perform his constitutional duty,” or because it is an unlawful delegation of 
legislative powers.
50
  Such challenges do not have a vertical dimension linking the federal 
to the state level, because the federal level in the U.S. has its own administration. The EU, 
however, is characterized by a Vollzugsföderalismus which means that empowering a new 
federal administrative body is intrinsically linked to the vertical order of competences. As a 
result, the question of how to control EU agencies, unlike in the U.S., will not be an 
exclusive “federal” affair, but should also involve the Member States. 
 
II.  The German Experience 
 
The EU and Germany share the logic of Vollzugsföderalismus. Therefore, the question of 
implementation of federal legislation raises issues of Länder competence. At the same 
time, unlike in the EU, hybrid forms of administration between direct and indirect 
administration are not tolerated by the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz (GG)), because it 
“precludes, apart from limited exceptions, a so-called mixed administration.”
51
 
 
The German Grundgesetz (GG),
52
 unlike the U.S. or EU constitutional charters, contains an 
elaborate section on “The Execution of Federal Laws and the Federal Administration.”
53
 
The German distinction between direct and indirect administration is not analogous to that 
which exists in the EU. In Germany, direct administration (unmittelbare Verwaltung) means 
                                                                                                                                        
ed., 2005); MIROSLAVA SCHOLTEN, THE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF EU AGENCIES: LEARNING FROM THE US EXPERIENCE 
(2014). Shapiro does take note of this issue. See Martin Shapiro, A Comparison of US and European Independent 
Agencies, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 300 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010). 
49 See, e.g., Calabresi, infra note 94; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997). 
50 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,  295 U.S. 
495, 542 (1935). 
51 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constituional Court] Dec. 20, 2007, Hartz IV-
Arbeitsgemeinschaften, 119 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 331, 365.  
52 The German Parliament provides an English translation of the Grundgesetz. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0060. 
53 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII. 
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that a body incorporated in the executive is responsible for administration, whereas under 
indirect administration (mittelbare Verwaltung) the administration is entrusted to legally 
independent bodies.
54
 This would require a search for the EU agencies’ counterparts 
among the bodies of indirect administration.
55
 Yet, Fischer notes that the “Federal 
Authorities [selbständige Bundesoberbehörden] are the closest thing to Quangos [that] the 
German system of direct administration can offer [although] the Federal Authorities 
cannot generally be described as independent administrative agencies with rule-making 
power.”
56
  
 
Indeed, the federal authorities will often represent Germany in EU agencies if they are not 
represented by a ministry (regular department).
57
 The identification of these bodies is 
straightforward precisely because of the elaborate section on the execution of federal 
legislation in the Basic Law.  
 
As Ziller points out, that elaborate GG section contrasts with the single Article found in the 
EU Treaties—Article 291 TFEU.
58
 With regard to the possible scope of Bundesverwaltung, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court has made clear that, under the structure of the 
Basic Law, the Bund’s legislative competence is, at the same time, the ultimate limit to its 
administrative competence.
59
 As to the implementation itself, Article 83 GG lays down the 
                                                     
54 HOWARD FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE: A GENERAL SURVEY TOGETHER WITH NOTES AND GERMAN 
VOCABULARY  5–6, 11 (4th ed. 2002). 
55 See, e.g., Joachim Wentzel, Agenturen im deutschen Verwaltungskontext: Nachzügler oder Vorreiter?, 63 DIE 
ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 768 (2010). 
56 A Quango is a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization in the U.K. See Kristian Fischer, Quangos—An 
Unknown Species in German Public Law? German Report on the Rulemaking Power of Independent Administrative 
Agencies, in RECENT TRENDS IN GERMAN AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 153, 195–60 (Eibe Riedel & Rudiger 
Wolfrum eds., 2006). Bach also stresses that the bodies of indirect administration are typically not involved in 
core public-sector functions. See Tobias Bach, Germany, in GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: PRACTICES AND LESSONS FROM 30 
COUNTRIES 166, 167–69 (Koen Verhoest et al. eds., 2012). 
57 The following are some of the bodies other than ministries, representing Germany in EU agencies: 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin] [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] which is an 
Anstalt; and Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte [BfArM] [Federal Institute for Drugs and 
Medical Devices], Eisenbahn-Bundesamt [EBA] [Federal Railway Authority], Bundesnetzagentur [BNetzA] [Federal 
Network Agency], and Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [BSI] [Federal Office for Information 
Security] which are selbständige Bundesoberbehörde. 
58 Jacques Ziller, Multilevel Governance and Executive Federalism: Comparing Germany and the European Union, 
in THE EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL ORDER AFTER LISBON 265 (Patrick Birkinshaw & Mike Varney eds., 2010). 
59 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 28, 1961, 1. Rundfunkentscheidung, 
12 BVerfGE 205, 229. 
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general rule similar to Article 291 (1) TFEU.
60
  Article 84 GG provides for the execution of 
federal legislation by the Länder “in their own right.”
61
  Article 85 GG details the execution 
“on federal commission,” which is limited to those material fields expressly mentioned in 
the Basic Law.
62
 These Articles will not be further discussed because the provisions 
immediately relevant here are those dealing with the implementation of federal legislation 
by the federation itself.
63
  
 
The two bodies, selbstandige Bundesoberbehörde and Anstalt, identified above are 
mentioned in the first sentence of Article 87 (3) of the GG: 
 
In addition, autonomous federal higher authorities as 
well as new federal corporations and institutions under 
public law may be established by a federal law for 
matters on which the Federation has legislative power. 
When the Federation is confronted with new 
responsibilities with respect to matters on which it has 
legislative power, federal authorities at intermediate 
and lower levels may be established, with the consent 
of the Bundesrat and of a majority of the Members of 
the Bundestag, in cases of urgent need.
64
 
 
Because the provisions of paragraph three are applicable in addition to the rules laid down 
in the two preceding paragraphs, it deals with the so-called optional federal 
administration, either through the federal higher authorities, or through the federal 
corporations and institutions under public law. 
 
Because the provisions of paragraph three are applicable in addition to the rules laid down 
in the two preceding paragraphs, it deals with the so-called optional federal 
administration, either through the federal higher authorities, or through the federal 
corporations and institutions under public law. 
                                                     
60 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 
83.  
61 This is the so called Ausführung als eigene Angelegenheit. 
62 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 
85. For a more elaborate discussion of these two types of Bundesverwaltung, see Ziller, supra note 58, at 268–74.  
63 The Bundeseigene Verwaltung therefore is one possible form of Bundesverwaltung, next to the options under 
Article 84 GG and Article 85 GG. 
64 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 
87 (3). 
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Because the first sentence of Article 87 (3) of the GG contains an optional course of action 
within the exceptional category of federal administration, this provision has been studied 
from a federalist perspective. Indeed, one of the first controversies regarding the provision 
was whether it contained both a Kompetenz and Organisationsnorm or only the latter—in 
other words, whether the provision only gives competence to the federation to establish 
some of its own authorities or whether it also includes the competence to entrust such 
authorities with implied tasks for which the Basic Law does not explicitly provide. In the 
Kreditwesen case,
65
 the Constitutional Court, following the dominant opinion in legal 
doctrine, confirmed that the first sentence of Article 87 (3) of the GG also qualifies as a 
Kompetenznorm.
66
 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this qualification. As 
Kalkbrenner noted, the areas in which the federation holds legislative competence are 
vast, and as a Kompetenznorm, the federal level can establish its own administration in 
these fields as it sees fit.
67
  Kalkbrenner predicted that the logic of Article 83 GG could be 
reversed,
68
 because a reliance on Article 87 (3) precludes the competence of the Länder.
69
 
As the Constitutional Court explained in Moratorium Gorleben, “[t]he federation may, by 
establishing this federal higher authority to which it grants certain tasks, claim the power 
of administration and at the same time end the competence of the Länder under Article 83 
GG.”
70
 
 
Because of the alleged lack of real constraints on the use of the first sentence of Article 87 
(3), Papier describes the provision as a Trojan horse.
71
 First, because it speaks of “matters 
on which the federation has legislative power,” a federal authority may be established for 
matters on which the federation has exclusive, concurring, or even implied legislative 
                                                     
65 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 24, 1962, Kreditwesen, 14 BVerfGE 197, 
202 [hereinafter Kreditwesen]. 
66 Id. at 210.  
67 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 
73, 74. 
68 Helmut Kalkbrenner, Zur Errichtung von Bundesoberbehörden nach Art. 87 III GG, 7 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 211 
(1963). 
69 DIETER HÖMIG, GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 515 (2010). 
70 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Dec. 5, 2001, Moratorium Gorleben, 104 
BVerfGE 238, 247 (own translation). 
71 Hans-Jürgen Papier, Die Regionalisierung der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht, 
4 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALRECHT 6, 242 (1995). 
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competence.
72
 Second, while the bodies have to be established by law, this law does not 
require the consent of the Bundesrat and may be adopted by the Bundestag alone—
contrary to the bodies provided for in the second sentence of Article 87 (3).
73
 As a result, 
the Länder lack control when new federal authorities are established and empowered. For 
this reason, ten of the sixteen Länder proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, in the 1990s to 
amend the provision so that the Bundesrat’s consent would be required to establish these 
bodies.
74
 In parallel with the exercise by the federation of its concurrent competences, 
which is subject to the Erforderlichkeitsklausel,
75
 it has been argued that the establishment 
of a new federal body should be subject to the condition that it is necessary because 
existing federal and Länder authorities cannot adequately fulfill the tasks concerned.
76
 
However, the Constitutional Court rejected this and observed that clause gives an exclusive 
competence to the Bund, that it does not differentiate between such bodies in fields of 
exclusive or shared competence, and—under an a contrario reasoning—that only the 
second sentence of Article 87 (3) refers to “cases of urgent need.”
77
 Lastly, while the first 
sentence of Article 87 (3) prescribes that the agencies be established through law, their 
further empowerments do not require legislative action and may be done by executive 
rulemaking.
78
 
 
Only two limits to the exercise of the competence in the first sentence of Article 87 (3). The 
first is the principle of federal loyalty, an unwritten principle of German constitutional law 
                                                     
72 Martin Ibler, Artikel 87 GG, in GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR, MÜNCHEN, BECK, ERGÄNZUNGSLIEFERUNG 64, 205 (Theodor 
Maunz & Günter Dürig eds., 2012). In case the matter falls with a concurring competence, the conditions for using 
such a competence should of course also be met. Focusing on the Erforderlichkeitsklausel, see GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art. 72 (2). 
73 See Ibler, supra note 72, at 209. 
74 It should be noted that the original draft of the Basic Law prescribed the consent of the Bundesrat for laws 
establishing Bundesoberbehörden. In the end, this provision did not make it to the final version. Further on this 
and on the proposed amendment in the 1990’s, see id. at 198–201. 
75 Id. at 205.  
76 Ibler, supra note 72, at 210–11.  
77 Kreditwesen at 213–14. 
78 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII, art.  
80 (1). The Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal Administrative Court] has confirmed that an Anstalt may be 
empowered either through (1) its establishing law, (2) a subsequent law, or (3) a Rechtsverordnung. See 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, [1996] 102 BVerwGE 119, 126. Appel and Eding conclude that Bundesoberbehörden 
may also be empowered through Rechtsverordnungen. See generally Markus Appel & Annegret Eding, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Verordnungsermächtigung des § 2 II NABEG, 6 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVWZ] 344 (2012).  
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that resembles the principle of loyal cooperation in EU law.
79
 In practice, it would appear 
difficult to rely on this principle to curtail the Bund.
 80
 The Constitutional Court read the 
second limit into Article 87 (3) and this limit prescribes that a federal authority or 
institution may only be established to entrust it with tasks which out of their nature may 
be practically executed at federal level for the entire territory of the Bund without needing 
to rely on further subordinate authorities or Länder authorities.
81
 One may question 
whether this is really a meaningful limit. Which task lends itself to be undertaken in a 
centralized manner is also affected by technological advances broadening the scope of 
government tasks that may practically be exercised at the federal level. Reicherzer further 
notes that because the federation is free to devote as many resources to a federal 
authority as it chooses, any task may be effectively centralized if the resources are 
unlimited.
82
  
 
Because of this, Reicherzer has argued for a revision of the Constitutional Court’s rejection 
in Kreditwesen of an Erforderlichkeitskriterium for the first sentence of Article 87 (3) GG.
83
 
By working out a test resembling a subsidiarity and proportionality test in EU law, 
Reicherzer concludes that in at least one specific case, the powers entrusted to the federal 
office for the environment in the carbon emissions trading system is in violation of the 
Basic Law.
84
 
 
The German experience shows how, in a system of Vollzugsföderalismus, the 
establishment of new federal bodies is relevant to the states. But in the EU federation, the 
states are in a much stronger position than the Länder. Originally, EU agencies were 
established under Article 352 TFEU, requiring unanimity in the Council. Today, EU agencies 
are established using the legal bases of the specific policy fields or Article 114 TFEU, which 
                                                     
79 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Besoldungsgesetz von Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Dec. 1, 1954, 4 BVERFGE 115, 140; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 
Volksbefragung Hessen, July 30, 1958, 8 BVERFGE 122, 138–39. 
80 See Ibler, supra note 72, at pp. 211–12. 
81 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Zollkriminalamt, Mar. 3, 2004, 110 
BVERFGE 33, 49; Kreditwesen at 211.  
82 See Max Reicherzer, Bundesoberbehörden: Trojanische Pferde für den Föderalismus? Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit 
der Zuständigkeitsbestimmungen im TEHG, 8 NVWZ 877 (2005). 
83 Reicherzer specifically takes issue with the Court’s “blunt” a contrario reasoning. To Reicherzer, it follows from 
the exceptional character of Article 87 (3) first sentence that the pouvoir constituant would have intended the 
provision to be used only when a clear need can be shown, albeit that the threshold required should not be as 
high as that of Article 87 (3) GG in the second sentence. See Reicherzer, supra note 82. 
84 See id. at 877–80. 
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most of the time, post-Lisbon, results in the ordinary legislative procedure. While Member 
States have lost their individual veto rights, collectively they are still a veto player, unlike 
the German Länder. In addition, the qualified majority being a super majority itself 
maintains a high threshold requirement. The Member States’ strong hold over the 
establishment of EU agencies ensures that the original rationale of agencification remains 
respected. It may also explain why the European Parliament, and not the Member States, 
has stressed questions of control over individual agencies  
 
E.  Empowering Subsidiary Executive Bodies Removed from the Core Executive 
 
I.  The United States Experience 
 
The fixation on the control over independent agencies makes an observer believe that the 
question as to which powers Congress may delegate to agencies is uncontested. This is not 
true, but it does appear that this matter has largely been settled. An important preliminary 
observation here is that the Supreme Court of the United States does not distinguish 
between congressional delegations to the President and delegations to agencies.  
 
For instance, Atlas Roofing
85
 confirmed that agencies may perform adjudicative functions 
through the administrative law judges which they house and Humphrey’s Executor
86
 
confirmed that agencies may combine such quasi-judicial powers with quasi-legislative 
powers.
87
 In Union Bridge Co. v. United States
88
 and Buttfield v. Stranahan,
89
 the Court 
provided further guidance and held that Congress could delegate some legislative power to 
the Treasury as long as that delegation contained a fixed primary standard, in which case 
“the Treasury [held] the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in 
the statute.”
90
 In United States v. Chicago, the Court further applied this jurisprudence to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission—the very first independent agency—and noted that 
“Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a 
prescribed standard.”
91
 From an EU perspective, the similarity between Union Bridge and 
the CJEU’s ruling in Meroni is evident as both cases focus on “mere executive” duties or 
                                                     
85 Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). 
86 Humphrey's Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935). 
87 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).  
88 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385 (1907). 
89 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904). 
90 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385 (1907) (emphasis added). 
91 United States v. Chicago, 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). 
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powers. It is then interesting how the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent jurisprudence has 
come to embrace the agencies’ far-reaching powers. 
 
In Hampton & Co. v. United States, the Court held that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by 
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the [delegate authority] is directed to 
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”
92
 The 
delegation of legislative power thus became permissible, as long as it conformed to 
Congress’ “intelligible principle,” begging the question how precise the principle needs to 
be. In later cases, the Court confirmed that vague notions, such as the requirement to act 
“in the public interest” or “as public convenience, interest or necessity requires,” were 
sufficiently precise.
93
  
 
Still, on two occasions the Court struck down Congressional delegations as being 
unconstitutional.
94
 In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court assessed the U.S. President’s 
power to prohibit the transportation of petroleum in excess of the amounts permitted by 
the states, under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).  According to the Court, the 
relevant section of the Act 
 
establishes no criterion to govern the President's 
course. It does not require any finding by the President 
as a condition of his action. The Congress . . . thus 
declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess 
production . . . it gives to the President an unlimited 
authority to determine the policy and to lay down the 
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.
95
  
 
                                                     
92 Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
93 N.Y. Central S. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932); Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. B. & M. Co., 
289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933). 
94 Sometimes it may be debated whether a delegation problem is at issue or not. For instance, in Clinton v. City of 
New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held part of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 unconstitutional because it created 
a new procedure to pass legislation. Calabresi argued that this case was not about legislative procedure but about 
a delegation of powers from Congress to the President. See Steven Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the 
Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 85–86 (2004). Justice Scalia, 
writing for the minority indeed argued as such. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 465 (1988).  
95 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,  293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935). 
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According to the Court, this empowerment was impermissible because it blurred the 
difference “between the delegation of power to make the law . . . and conferring authority 
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.”
96
  
 
In Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, the Court struck down the President’s 
power to promulgate binding “codes of fair competition” finding that “the discretion of the 
President in approving or prescribing codes . . . is virtually unfettered.”
97
  
 
The fact that the last two cases involved delegations to the President rather than to 
independent agencies is not relevant, because the material factor in the Court’s analysis is 
whether Congress in its legislation laid down a sufficiently clear standard, guiding the 
delegate authority in its exercise of the delegated powers. Again, U.S. constitutional law, 
unlike EU law, does not make a distinction between delegations to the President and 
delegations to other executive actors.
98
  
 
Justice White in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha concluded that despite 
the early cases such as United States v. Chicago,
99
 “restrictions on the scope of the power 
that could be delegated diminished and all but disappeared.”
100
 After the exceptional 1935 
cases, the Court reaffirmed its lax scrutiny of delegations as long as Congress provided 
some limiting standard guiding the delegate authority. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins, the Court stressed the necessity of delegation to ensure the effectiveness of 
legislative and administrative process.
101
 In Yukas v. United States, the Court further 
emphasized that Congress is not under an obligation to choose the least amount of 
delegation necessary.
102
  
 
In addition, judicial review now intervenes at the stage when a delegated power is 
exercised, scrutinizing the delegated act in light of the Constitution and the delegating 
                                                     
96 Id. at 426. 
97 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). Justice Cardozo, who dissented in 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, wrote a concurring opinion, setting out why he thought the two delegations were 
different and why the Schechter delegation did not conform to the limits he set out in Panama. See id. at 551–55. 
98 See also Robert Schütze, “Delegated” Legislation in the (New) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis, 74 
MOD. L. REV. 5, 664 (2011). 
99 See United States v. Chicago, 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). 
100 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 985 (1983).  
101 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398–99 (1940). 
102 Yukas v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944). 
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statute,
103
 rather than scrutinizing the delegating statute itself.
104
 As a result, the Supreme 
Court in the Benzene case applied its general rule of constitutional avoidance,
105
 re-
interpreting an unclear Congressional delegation so that it would not run afoul of the non-
delegation doctrine,
106
 even if the reinterpretation itself was a rather questionable 
departure from the literal reading of the statute.
107
  
 
Unlike in the U.S., the EU legal order distinguishes between empowering the core 
executive—the Commission—and subsidiary executive bodies. The former is subject to the 
rule originally laid down in Köster,
108
 which bars the Commission from touching on the 
essential elements of legislation and imposes a duty on the legislature to deal with these 
elements itself. Post-Lisbon, the provisions of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU govern the 
Commission’s executive rule-making power. Meroni, as confirmed in Short-selling, governs 
empowerments of EU agencies.
109
 While the original Meroni ruling was much less 
permissive than the rule laid down for delegations to the Commission in Köster, Short-
selling’s reinterpretation of Meroni gives the opposite result. As Ohler and Skowron 
noted,
110
 after Short-selling, it has become easier for the EU legislature to empower EU 
agencies—unforeseen under the Treaties—than it is to empower the Commission, given 
the framework and requirements laid down in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.  
 
II.  The German Experience 
 
As noted above, the question of establishing and empowering agencies has mostly 
received attention from a federalism perspective. The detail of the German Basic Law 
                                                     
103 See van der Mensbrugghe, supra note 48, at 118. 
104 See, for example Brown & Williamson, where the Supreme Court held that the FDA was not competent to 
regulate tobacco products: given tobacco’s cultural and economic importance it could not be assumed that 
Congress had implicitly granted jurisdiction to the FDA. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,  529 U.S. 120, 
159–60 (2000). 
105 United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408–09 (1909). 
106 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). 
107 Brigham Cluff, American Trucking and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A New Twist on an Old Doctrine, 40 
JURIMETRICS 485, 491–93 (2000). 
108 Case 25/70, Köster, 1970 E.C.R. 1161. 
109 See Short-selling, supra note 12, paras 41–53. 
110 Christoph Ohler, Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der Europäischen Wertpapier- und Marktaufsichtsbehörde (ESMA), 
69 JZ 5, 251 (2014); Magdalena Skowron, Kapitalmarktrecht: Rechtmäßigkeit der Eingriffsbefugnisse der ESMA 
nach Art. 28 Leerverkaufsverordnung, 25 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EUZW] 349, 353 (2014). 
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should also be viewed from a separation of powers perspective.  Article 80 (1) GG explicitly 
provides that the legislature may authorize the government to adopt “statutory 
instruments” provided that the legislature also specifies the content, purpose, and scope 
of the power conferred. This is very similar to Article 290 TFEU; but unlike in the EU, the 
Grundgesetz further allows the sub-delegation of this power. This possibility exists under 
the GG because the federal authorities, despite being “independent,” and the public 
institutions, despite their separate legal personality, are still subject to the supervision of 
the highest federal authorities, the ministries, who may also still issue directives.
111
 
Because of this, many reject any analogy with the American federal agencies discussed 
above, beyond than their mutual qualification as “regulatory authority.”
112
 Despite 
ministry supervision, Ludwigs notes two recent trends which have strengthened the 
independence of federal authorities: (1) Pressures from EU legislation requiring the 
Member States to establish increasingly independent regulatory authorities,
113
 and (2) a 
more progressive interpretation of this new legislation by the German administrative 
courts, which may strengthen the independence of federal authorities.
114
 From this, 
Ludwigs sees an evolution towards the model of the American regulatory authority.
115
 
 
Under German public law, the strengthened independence of regulatory authorities, 
imposed by EU law, conflicts with the principle of democracy.
116
 This was also apparent in 
Commission v. Germany, which dealt with the EU requirement that national data 
supervisors act “with complete independence.”
117
 The German Länder had implemented 
the EU Directive in such a way that a supervisor was still subject to scrutiny by its Land 
government. While Advocate General Mazák suggested a dismissal of the case,
118
 the Court 
                                                     
111 Ibler, supra note 72, at 218–20. 
112 See Matthias Ruffert, Regulierung im System des Verwaltungsrechts - Grundstrukturen des 
Privatisierungsfolgerechts der Post und Telekommunikation, 124 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 237, 277 n.176 
(1999). 
113 Halberstam also notes that the birth of the Bundesnetzagentur was not the result of an indigenous 
development but followed from EU law requirements. See Daniel Halberstam, The Promise of Comparative 
Administrative Law: A Constitutional Perspective on Independent Agencies, in EDWARD ELGAR, COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 197 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010).  
114 Markus Ludwigs, Die Bundesnetzagentur auf dem Weg zur Independent Agency? Europarechtliche Anstöße und 
verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen, 44 DIE VERWALTUNG 1, 41 (2011). 
115 Id. at 42. 
116 This is of course relevant to all EU Member States.  
117 Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-1885, para. 1. 
118 AG Mazàk further noted that the problem in this case also related to the conflict between the traditional 
concept of administration and the (more modern) concept based on decentralization. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Mazák, Case C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-1885, para. 8; sources cited supra note 6. 
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held the action to be well founded. In its pleadings, Germany had inter alia invoked the 
Demokratieprinzip, but the Court followed an EU, rather than a national interpretation of 
this principle and the EU principle “does not preclude the existence of public authorities 
outside the classic hierarchical administration and more or less independent of the 
government.”
119
 The Court also emphasized that the independence in question only 
related to the supervisor’s relationship with the executive and not with the legislature 
even if one year earlier the Court had also sanctioned a limitation on the national 
legislature’s discretion in predefining an NRA’s policy.
120
 
 
The traditional German conception of the Demokratieprinzip is based on Article 20 (2) GG 
from which the German Constitutional Court elaborated an important doctrine:
121
 The 
exercise of public power is only legitimate—in other words, democratic—if there is an 
uninterrupted chain of legitimacy (ununterbrochene Legitimationskette) from the people 
to the wielders of public power. In Mitbestimmungsgesetz Schleswig-Holstein, the Court 
clarified this by reference to the personal democratic legitimacy of public officials and the 
substantive legitimacy scrutinized by the people or parliament:  
 
The exercise of public power is only then 
democratically legitimate when the appointment of its 
wielders, affording them personal legitimacy, may be 
traced back to the people and when their actions 
themselves are equally legitimate, namely when the 
wielders of public power act under the authority of the 
government and in line with its directives, allowing the 
government to take on responsibility before the people 
and parliament.
122
  
 
In this case, the Court ruled that the arbitrary powers of the joint civil servants’ committee 
were in violation of the Demokratieprinzip because its members were not personally 
legitimized and because the committee could not receive instructions from the ministry, 
which could, in turn, not be held accountable by the parliament. 
                                                     
119 Case C-518/07 at para. 42. 
120 See Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 2009 E.C.R. I-11431. 
121 A number of German authors have therefore criticized Short-selling for its lack of attention to the 
repercussions on the Demokratieprinzip. See Ohler, supra note 110, at 250–52. 
122 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Lippeverband, Dec. 5, 2002, 107 
BVERFGE 59, 87-88 [hereinafter Lippeverband]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 
Mitbestimmungsgesetz Schleswig-Holstein, May 24, 1995, 93 BVERFGE 37, 67.  
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As Wiedemann points out, the Court’s insistence in Mitbestimmungsgesetz Schleswig-
Holstein on the ultimate responsibility of the relevant government minister was heavily 
criticized and may have led it to taking a more progressive approach in Lippeverband.
123
 In 
the latter case, the Court noted the following:  
 
In consequence of its quality as a principle, Article 20 
(2) GG is also open to change. The state authority being 
‘derived from the people’ should both be noticeable 
and practically realizable for both the people and the 
state authorities. When the circumstances change, 
adaptions may become necessary.
124
  
 
Even if Lippeverband dealt with a problem of personal and not substantive legitimacy, the 
Court held that Article 20 (2) of the Basic Law in its entirety was open to change and this 
flexibility could therefore help to reconcile national agencification with the 
Demokratieprinzip. After all, as Ludwigs notes, the requirement that the exercise of public 
power be substantively legitimate becomes problematic if independent, in the American 
sense, regulatory authorities are vested with powers.
125
 
 
To justify a deficit in substantive legitimacy, Ludwigs proposes a strengthening of the 
personal legitimacy and a strengthening of the oversight powers of the Parliament.
126
 The 
latter is also proposed by Wiedemann as an alternative to the control exercised through 
the issuance of directives by a government minister.
127
  
 
Because of this, it may be assumed that the issue of control, so central in the discussion on 
the U.S. federal agencies, over Bundesoberbehörden or Anstalten will be the subject of a 
new debate in Germany, where it had lain dormant for many years because of the well-
established hierarchical supervision by the ministries. The latter model is ultimately 
                                                     
123 Richard Wiedemann, Unabhängige Verwaltungsbehörden und die Rechtsprechung des BVerfG, in UNABHÄNGIGE 
REGULIERUNGSBEHÖRDEN: ORGANISATIONSRECHTLICHE HERAUSFORDERUNGEN IN FRANKREICH UND DEUTSCHLAND 46–47 
(Johannes Masing & Gérard Marcou eds., 2010). 
124 Lippeverband, at 122.  
125 Ludwigs, supra note 114, at 47. 
126 According to Ludwigs, if independence is absolutely necessary (zwingend erforderlich) for an authority to 
achieve its policy objectives, this could also justify a Demokratiedefizit. Id. at 48. 
127 See Wiedemann, supra note 123, at 48. On the power to issue directives, see Georg Hermes, Abhängige und 
unabhängige Verwaltungsbehörden - ein Überblick über die Bundesverwaltung, in UNABHÄNGIGE 
REGULIERUNGSBEHÖRDEN: ORGANISATIONSRECHTLICHE HERAUSFORDERUNGEN IN FRANKREICH UND DEUTSCHLAND 68 (Johannes 
Masing & Gérard Marcou eds., 2010). 
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incompatible with the model promoted by the EU legislature, which emphasizes genuine 
independence, or a more U.S.-style independence as Ludwigs would say, for regulatory 
authorities.  
What then does the German experience bring to the EU table? The seemingly deep-rooted 
and dogmatic concern, even despite Lippeverband, for the Demokratieprinzip has thus far 
inhibited American-style agencification in Germany. The United States Supreme Court has 
made a link between the democratic accountability of the President and his control over 
independent agencies. The German case is then a strong expression of the fundamental 
issue of the democratic legitimacy of agencies. The repercussions for the EU are still vague 
because the democratic finality of the EU has not been settled yet. Without entering into 
the debate of whether a democratic deficit exists in the EU and how serious it is if there is 
one, it is fair to say that the democratic character of the EU is still in flux. Were the EU to 
evolve towards a parliamentary system, it is clear that the position of the European 
Parliament would need to be strengthened. In any event, it would seem difficult to claim 
that the Member States’ involvement in agencification—in the Council and in the 
individual agencies’ Boards—results in a sufficient indirect democratic legitimacy. 
F.  Judicial Deference to Subsidiary Executive Bodies’ Decisions 
 
I.  The United States Experience 
 
Because the focus shifted to the legality of federal U.S. agencies’ actions under their own 
mandate, the question of interpretation of those mandates has also gained importance. 
The answer to the question of who is competent to interpret the statutory mandate of an 
agency would seem obvious in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
128
 
Yet, it was soon recognized that agencies themselves hold useful experience to solve 
questions of interpretation. In questions of application of the law,
129
 the agencies’ 
expertise holds some weight.
130
 In Skidmore v. Swift & Company, the question at issue was 
whether firefighters’ “waiting time” could be qualified as “working time.”
131
 Although the 
Court emphasized that the Administrator’s interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
                                                     
128 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
129 In addition, when Congress explicitly delegated the power to interpret or refine the law to an agency, courts 
deferred under an arbitrary and capricious test of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
130 Linda Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive's Power to Make and Interpret Law, 
44 LOY. U. CHICAGO. L.J. 141, 160–61 (2012). 
131 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136–37 (1944). 
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could not be binding on courts, it did acknowledge that the Administrator had greater 
expertise and experience in the matter than an ordinary judge and should therefore be 
considered.
132
 The weight of the Administrator’s interpretation would be determined by 
the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade.”
133
 This came to be known as Skidmore deference; because while the agency 
opinion is not controlling, the agency could persuade the courts, which differed from the 
Supreme Court’s previously implied preference for judicial review of agencies’ 
interpretations.
134
 
 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
135
 however, the Court 
introduced a new test for deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations, and in doing so 
abolished the importance of the distinction between pure questions of law and the 
application of law.
136
 The Court’s reasoning rested on—perhaps questionable assumptions 
of—agency expertise, the greater accountability of (executive) agencies compared to 
politically unaccountable judges,
137
 and the idea that Congress chose to delegate 
significant power by drafting ambiguous statutes.
138
  
 
In Chevron, the issue arose from the Environmental Protection Agency interpretation of 
“stationary source” in the Clean Air Act.
139
 The EPA defined “stationary source” as 
encompassing all pollution emitting devices of an industrial plant as if they were contained 
in one “bubble.”
140
 This conception was challenged for conserving rather than ameliorating 
pollution’s effect on air quality. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, introduced the 
now famous two-step Chevron test:  
 
                                                     
132 Id. at 139–40. 
133 Id. at 140. 
134  See Matthew Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2007).  
135 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
136 See Jellum, supra note 130, at 165. 
137 See Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 452, 466 (1989). 
138 David Gosset, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 
681, 688–90 (1997). 
139 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 at 840. 
140 Id. at 840 n.2. 
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When a court reviews an agency's construction of the 
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
questions. First, always, is the question whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter . . . . If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary 
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather . . . the question for the court is whether the 
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.
141
  
 
After Chevron, if Congress does not clearly settle an issue or define a term, courts should 
defer to the agencies’ interpretation as long as it is reasonable. This new test strengthened 
the administrative state and was described as a counter-Marbury,
142
 relegating courts to 
the marginal role of enforcing only unambiguous provisions.
143
 
 
However, in its jurisprudence following Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced what 
has been called the “Chevron Step Zero,”
144
 preceding the two original steps. In this Step 
Zero, a court will ascertain whether the agency interpretation at issue actually merits 
Chevron deference. After all, Chevron itself dealt with an interpretation having the force of 
law,
145
 adopted after following a notice-and-comment procedure by an executive 
agency.
146
 
                                                     
141 Id. at 842–43. 
142 Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990). 
143 Thomas Merril, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 969–70 (1992). But Merril himself 
rejects the idea of Chevron as a counter-Marbury. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court also ruled that Chevron 
deference trumps stare decisis when an agency interprets ambiguous text previously interpreted by a court. See 
National Cable & Telecommunications Association et al. v. Brand X Internet Services et al., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005). 
144 Thomas Merril & Kristin Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873 (2001). 
145 It is not clear what is to be understood by the force of law and in Christensen, but especially in United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Court further complicated the issue. See also Linda Jellum, United States 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: Has It Mastered Chevron's Step Zero, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 1, 87–97 (2011). 
146 The deference in Chevron was not only based on the agency’s expertise, but also on its political accountability, 
coming under the authority of the President. Evidently this second element applies much less to the independent 
agencies but the U.S. Supreme Court has still afforded Chevron deference to independent agencies. For a 
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To illustrate this significance: In Christensen v. Harris County,
147
 the Supreme Court found 
that an opinion letter from the Department of Labor could not receive Chevron deference 
because it lacked the force of law and was not arrived at by a formal adjudication or a 
notice-and-comment procedure. Instead, the letter was entitled to a lesser Skidmore 
deference in so far as it had the “power to persuade.”
148
 In United States v. Mead 
Corporation,
149
 the Supreme Court further clarified that Chevron had not introduced a new 
single rule on deference.
150
 Even in absence of an express delegation by Congress to an 
agency of authoritative interpretation, there could be an implied delegation apparent in 
the agency’s “generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances” in which 
case courts should also defer to the agency’s interpretation.
151
 In Chevron, the implied 
delegation was deduced from the authorization to engage in rulemaking. The Court in 
Mead confirmed that the notice-and-comment procedure was not a conditio sine qua non 
for Chevron deference but held that nothing suggested that Congress had meant the 
“classification rulings” at issue in Mead to deserve Chevron-type deference.
152
 To conclude 
with an understatement, the Court in Mead did not really clarify the scope of the Chevron 
deference. Justice Scalia in his dissent noted: 
 
[T]he one test for Chevron deference that the Court 
enunciates is wonderfully imprecise: whether 
“Congress delegated authority to the agency generally 
to make rules carrying the force of law, . . . as by  . . . 
adjudication[,] notice-and-comment rulemaking, or . . . 
some other [procedure] indicati[ng] comparable 
congressional intent.” . . . . In the present case, it tells 
us, the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
(and [“who knows?] of some other procedure 
indicating comparable congressional intent”) is not 
                                                                                                                                        
discussion, see Randolph May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 429–53 (2006). 
147 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).  
148 Id. at 587. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia dismissed Skidmore as an anachronism, arguing that Chevron 
deference should be applied in this case as well. Justice Scalia still concurred, because he found the interpretation 
of the Department of Labor unreasonable in any case. Id. at 589–91. 
149 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
150 Id. at 229–31. 
151 Id. at 229. 
152 Id. at 229–31. 
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enough to decide the question of Chevron deference, 
“for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron 
deference even when no such administrative formality 
was required and none was afforded.”
153
  
 
As Justice Scalia noted, Mead cancelled Chevron’s presumption that statutory ambiguity 
implies agency authority, by demanding that Congress’ implicit intent to delegate is shown. 
But how this intent could be demonstrated was left unclear. Whereas in Christensen, 
Chevron Step Zero seemed to depend on the force of law of an agency interpretation, the 
Court in Mead suggested that a complex assessment should be undertaken in Chevron Step 
Zero.
154
 This lack of clarity was repeated in Barnhart v. Walton, where a regulation of the 
Social Security Administration was entitled to Chevron deference, despite it lacking the 
force of law and without the agency having followed formal procedures.
155
 In cases such as 
MCI and Brown & Williamson,
156
 the Court seemed to have added a non-delegation 
dimension to its Chevron Step Zero, whereby Congress’ implicit intent to delegate “minor 
questions” could be presumed, all the while reserving major questions for the 
legislature.
157
 
 
Chevron and its “domain”
158
 remain a contentious topic in legal academic doctrine.
159
 The 
fact that the Supreme Court mitigated part of its Chevron ruling in its later cases should not 
obfuscate the remarkably strong position which agencies hold in the U.S. federal system 
and the rather large gap which exists between how the “administrative state” in the U.S. 
functions today and how one would expect it to function if one were guided solely by the 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 
                                                     
153 Id. at 245. 
154 Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 216 (2005). 
155 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).  
156 In MCI, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that where an agency has the authority to “modify” certain requirements 
in a section of the basic statute this cannot be understood as granting the power to fundamentally alter that 
section, because “modifying” is commonly understood as (only) “changing slightly or incrementally.” See MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.,  529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).  
157 Sunstein proposes to include these questions in Chevron step One, because this would otherwise mean that 
courts become competent to solve major questions for which they have no superior claim than the executive 
branch. See Sunstein, supra note 154, at 243.  
158 See Merril and Hickman, supra note 144. 
159 A search in the HeinOnline database for the query “Chevron deference” results in hundreds of academic 
contributions discussing (and generally criticizing) Chevron and the cases which followed it. 
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Because the question of judicial deference vis-à-vis agency decisions only comes into play 
after it is established that agencies may be empowered to take binding decisions, that 
question has, so far, not been so much debated in relation to EU agencies. As was noted, 
the Court in Short-selling emphasized that EU agencies’ powers should be “amenable to 
judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority.”
160
 The 
reference to the agencies’ powers being scrutinized suggests that the Court will focus on 
the legislature’s act delegating powers to the agency. But the U.S. experience show that 
this focus may shift to scrutinizing specific agency acts in the light of the (legislative) 
mandate and the Treaties. In this regard, practice so far shows that the General Court 
applies the same standard of deference to agency decisions as it does to those of the 
Commission;
161
 this practice incidentally shows how EU agencies have for a long time fallen 
afoul of the Court’s Meroni doctrine which prohibits them from exercising discretionary 
powers.
162
 More precisely, when an authority within the EU administration must make 
complex or technical assessments, the Court only exercises a marginal review. This is still in 
line with Short-selling, because by all standards the Court’s marginal review still qualifies as 
“judicial review” but it should be clear that the agency will have an appreciable margin to 
decide how to pursue the legislator’s objectives. 
 
One way of addressing this risk is by expanding the system of the Boards of Appeal.
163
 
These Boards are a typical feature in certain EU agencies, which have been given a 
significant decision-making function and allow for a more thorough review of technical 
agency decisions when compared to the review offered by an ordinary judge. If these 
Boards fulfill their role properly, the legal protection offered to private parties may be 
significantly enhanced. 
 
II.  The German Experience 
 
The framework to assess the executive’s discretion in Germany is much more complicated 
than it is in the U.S. or in other EU Member States. In Germany, an initial distinction is 
made between Tatbestand and Rechtsfolge, or discretion on whether the facts in a specific 
case meet the conditions set out in the norm and discretion on the legal effects. The 
                                                     
160 See Short-selling, supra note 12, para. 53. 
161 See Case T-187/06, Schräder v. CPVO, 2008 E.C.R. II-3151, para. 59; Case T-96/10, Rütgers Germany GmbH e.a. 
v. ECHA, ECLI:EU:T:2013:109, para. 134. 
162 See Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine Make Sense?, 17 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 281, 
294 (2010). 
163 For a discussion, see generally Merijn Chamon, EU Risk Regulators and EU Procedural Law, 5 EUR. J. RISK REG. 3 
(2014). 
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former defines legal concepts which have not been sufficiently defined by the legislature. 
Here the courts exercise a full review of the executive’s decision with a goal of uniformity 
by operating under the “ideal of the single correct decision.”
164
 In rare cases, the executive 
has a Beurteilungspielraum, or a margin of appreciation, which is the first type of possible 
executive discretion. The other two traditional types of discretion fall under the 
Rechtsfolge, the second distinction, and include general administrative discretion and 
planning discretion.  
 
At the same time, German administrative law, just like that of the other Member States, 
has not been immune from the influence of EU legislation even if national autonomy is the 
rule and EU intervention remains the exception in the administrative sphere. Under 
increasing pressures of EU internal market law, the Federal Administrative Court has 
created a new type of discretion
165
—regulatory discretion—in which the distinction 
between Tatbestand and Rechtsfolge is ignored and courts will defer to the federal 
network agency’s interpretation ambiguous legislative provisions.
166
  
 
Arcor is an importance case in which the administrative court of Cologne had to rule on a 
decision of the federal network agency which fixed certain rates that Deutsche Telekom 
could charge to Arcor for access to its infrastructure. One of the questions that the 
administrative court referred to the Court of Justice was whether the federal network 
agency was “entitled, when assessing cost-orientation in the context of its authority under 
[the relevant EU legislation], to a ‘margin of discretion’ [subject] only to limited judicial 
control?”
167
 In its answer, the Court confirmed that national regulatory authorities have 
been granted broad discretion under EU telecoms legislation.
168
 At the same time, it 
confirmed its traditional approach on national procedural law noting: “[I]t is a matter 
solely for the Member States, within the context of their procedural autonomy, to 
determine, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of judicial 
                                                     
164 For a discussion, see Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, Nachprüfung von Ermessensentscheidungen, in 
VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG: VWGO 2395 (Helge Sodan & Jan Ziekow eds., 2014). 
165 However, Ludwigs notes that EU legislation does not require national judges to be deferential to regulatory 
authorities, as is also apparent from the discussion of Arcor, since it only deals with the NRA’s relationship with 
the legislator. See Ludwigs, supra note 114, at 68–69. 
166 See Joachim Wieland, Regulierungsermessen im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen deutschem und Unionsrecht, 64 
Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 705, 706 (2011).  
167 Case C-55/06, Arcor AG & Co. KG, 2008 E.C.R. I-2931, para. 39. 
168 Id. at para. 159. 
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protection . . .  the detailed rules of judicial review with respect to decisions of the 
NRAs.”
169
  
 
In its main proceedings, the Cologne administrative court used the Court’s answer to 
specifically emphasize the NRAs’ “only limitedly scrutinizable margin of discretion.”
170
 The 
federal administrative court on appeal, noted that the federal network agency had a 
Beurteilungsspielraum, which closely resembled the regulatory discretion. As a result, it 
could only determine whether the contested decision was “reasonably and completely 
argued in view of the criteria explicitly or implicitly laid down in the legislative norm.”
171
 
The latter two requirements could indeed come close to the Supreme Court standard laid 
out in Chevron.
172
  
 
The resulting complexity and the need to ensure the compatibility of Germany’s 
administrative law to the EU and the other Member States prompts Ludwigs to propose a 
single regime of executive discretion that merges the existing types.
173
 This would not 
mean that German courts would defer just as readily as U.S. courts to agency decisions. 
Wimmer notes that German legal tradition is rather suspicious of the possibility for the 
administration to adopt acts that are not fully reviewable by the courts.
174
 This stems from 
Article 19 (4) GG which textually does not rule out the possibility for courts to be highly 
deferential to decisions of the executive, but which has been interpreted as doing so by 
the Constitutional Court.
175
 As expressed in Behördliches Beschwerderecht: 
 
The importance of this constitutional protection mainly 
lies in the nullification of the executive acting on its 
self-interest in its relationship with the citizen. Its 
objective is not just limited to submitting every act of 
                                                     
169 Id. at para. 170.  
170 Verwaltungsgericht Köln [Cologne Administrative Court], Aug. 27, 2009, 1 K 3427/01, para. 121. See also 
Ludwigs, supra note 114, at 66.  
171 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BverwG] [Federal Administrative Court] Nov. 23, 2011, 6 C 13.10, para. 38. 
172 See Thorsten Attendorn, Das “Regulierungsermessen” Ein deutscher „Sonderweg” bei der gerichtlichen 
Kontrolle tk-rechtlicher Regulierungsentscheidungen?, 12 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 238, 239 (2009). 
173 Markus Ludwigs, Das Regulierungsermessen als Herausforderung für die letztentscheidungsdogmatik im 
Verwaltungsrecht, 64 JZ 6, 292–94 (2009); see also Matthias Jestaedt, Maßstäbe des Verwaltungshandelns, in 
ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 351 (Hans-Uwe Erichsen ed., 2010). 
174 Norbert Wimmer, Kontrolldichte - Beobachtungen zum richterlichen Umgang mit Entscheidungsprärogativen, 
65 JZ 433, 433 (2010). 
175 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VIII. Art. 
19(4).  
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the executive restricting citizens’ rights to a full, namely 
both factually and legally, legal review . . . .
176
 
 
From this jurisprudence it follows that the recourse to courts laid out in Article 19 (4) GG is 
traditionally understood as granting full jurisdiction to the courts both on matters of law 
and fact with marginal review being the exception. While the tension between EU law and 
this traditional jurisprudence is not exclusive to the question of national agencies’ 
discretion,
177
 it is clear that the regulatory discretion granted to the federal network 
agency also sits uncomfortably with that jurisprudence.
178
 Here, Wimmer questioned 
whether the legislature should not write down a list of objectives and prioritize among 
them, insisting that the legislature deal with the strategic questions and continue to insist 
on a judicial scrutiny of how legislation is implemented.
179
 However, it was exactly that 
course of action that the Court of Justice ruled out in Commission v. Germany.
180
 Germany 
had limited the discretion of the NRA in the telecoms sector by setting out which 
regulatory objectives should be prioritized. The Court agreed with the Commission who 
argued that this was not a proper implementation of the relevant directives and that the 
German NRA should have been accorded greater powers.
181
 In a very critical comment on 
this case, Gärditz noted that “this European ideal could hardly be in more contrast with the 
passed down pattern of argumentation in German constitutional law.”
182
 In contrast, 
Ludwigs referred back to the actual wording of Article 19 (4), which, on its face, would 
allow for an EU obligation prescribing a limited judicial review.
183
  
 
It is apparent that the German experience with judicial deference to administrative 
discretion cannot be understood without reference to the European context. Ultimately 
this question is linked to that of EU agencification. This is because the EU will often not 
only impose an obligation on the Member States to establish NRA’s, but it will also 
                                                     
176 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constituional Court] 1973, 119 BverfGE 263, 274. 
177 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, 1991 E.C.R. I-5469, 
para. 11. Note the Bundesfinanzhof’s problem with the well-established limited review standard of the Court of 
Justice in Technische Universität München. 
178 Wimmer, supra note 174, at 435. 
179 See id. at 438; see also Attendorn, supra note 172, at 241. 
180 Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 2009 E.C.R. I-11431. 
181 Id. at paras 53–100. 
182 Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, Anmerkung zur Rechtssache C-424/07, 65 JZ 198, 200 (2010).  
183 Ludwigs, supra note 114, at 68. 
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establish an EU agency as the EU counterpart to the NRA’s, making these actors collectively 
responsible for the implementation of EU law in a given field. The question is not so much 
what the EU can learn from the limited German experience, but whether we will see a 
convergence of national administrative law in those fields subject to strong legislative EU 
harmonization when regulators are established at both EU and national levels. Because 
these regulators engage in composite procedures, it would make sense to evolve towards a 
more uniform standard for reviewing administrative discretion. 
 
G.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The state of agencification in the U.S. and Germany is very different but both provide 
lessons for the EU. These two excursions have highlighted a number of issues: First, in the 
federal system with an uncontested federal administration, the practice of establishing and 
empowering independent agencies has foremost been debated in the light of the 
separation of powers. Second, in the federal system in which federal administration is an 
exception to the rule, federal agencies have predominantly been scrutinized under a 
federalist perspective, with the agencies identified as possible threats to the autonomy of 
the federal entities. This is not to say that the notion of control is absent in the second type 
of federal system. As was observed, the mechanism to control such agencies was actually 
firmly established and has only been recently contested under pressures from European 
integration. Third, the notion of control, which is of fundamental importance in both types 
of federal polity, is always linked to the notion of democracy. Because Congress should lay 
down a sufficiently clear standard for the agency to enforce, or because the President, in 
order to be accountable to the people, should have sufficient control over an agency, or 
because the Legitimationskette ultimately goes back to the people. Here, it should be 
noted that in the EU, the democratic question still is in flux, which has repercussions for 
the question of who, and to which degree, should control EU agencies.  
 
Following Short-selling, these issues will become more prominent for EU agencies as well. 
The traditional tribute paid by institutions to Meroni resulted in a certain restraint in 
empowering EU agencies. Now that the Court has reinterpreted Meroni rather liberally, 
this restraint may gradually flounder. The above-mentioned issues will surface and the EU 
institutions will have to address the issues of control and democratic accountability. 
Evidently, these issues partially surpass the competences of the institutions and should be 
tackled in primary law. Yet, even within their competences, the institutions have failed to 
tackle these issues as the Common Approach on Decentralized Agencies illustrates. 
 
Looking at the polity with the greatest experience in agencification, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in the United States appears inspired by a large deal of pragmatism. It is this 
pragmatic view on the modern administrative state that explains the far-reaching powers 
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delegated to agencies.
184
 Yet, in itself, this pragmatism is insufficient to ensure effective 
governance. Here the U.S.’ system of checks and balances comes into play. Despite the 
wording of the U.S. Constitution not permitting agencification at first sight, the U.S. federal 
system and its institutions have acquired the necessary maturity allowing for the creation 
and empowerment of independent agencies without risking the subversion of the balance 
among the three branches established in the Constitution. As Geradin notes, “even if there 
is a large consensus that powers can and should be delegated to agencies, Congress, the 
President, and the courts will compete to influence their policies.”
185
 Indeed, this appears 
to be where the maturity of the U.S. federal system seems to prove itself, as potential 
shocks caused by the delegation of powers to agencies and the exercise of such powers are 
absorbed. The traditional three branches  having acquired the necessary (political) strength 
and authority. 
 
Specifically for the Presidency, considered to be the weaker of the two political branches 
(thus not including the courts) at the time of the framing of the Constitution,
186
 it is 
noteworthy that agencification has chronologically followed the rise in presidential power, 
which the ambiguous text of the Constitution allows “to grow with the developing 
nation.”
187
 Even if proponents of the unitary executive theory—for example, in the past, 
the Reagan administration—would argue that independent agencies undermine the 
President’s position as head of the executive, no one would argue today that Congress, by 
establishing independent agencies, is nullifying the importance of the presidential office. 
Instead, strong independent agencies have even been presented as part of the checks and 
balances against an increasingly strong president. 
 
In so far as necessary, it may be noted that the EU differs considerably from the U.S. on 
this point. The EU is hardly a mature polity. The status of its constitutional charter is in no 
way comparable to that of the U.S. Constitution. Rather, it is the subject of an almost 
permanent diplomatic conference and, as a result, the positions of the EU’s main 
institutions are not settled and the agencification experiment entails more risks.  
 
                                                     
184 See for example the Court’s observation in Mistretta: “[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical 
understanding that in our increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to 
delegate power.” See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
185 Geradin, supra note 48, at 13. 
186 See William Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 505, 507–09 (2008). 
187 See id. at 509. 
1 5 2  G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   Vol. 17 No. 02 
While the Court of Justice in Short-selling has not completely opened the door to U.S.-style 
agencification, it has paved the way to more significant powers being exercised by EU 
agencies.
188
 It would be commendable for the EU to contemplate its democratic and 
institutional finality before embarking on further significant agencification. Ultimately, this 
is what the Commission proposed to do in its 2001 White Paper on Governance, suggesting 
the adoption of a binding framework governing agencification.
189
 Because of a lack of 
agreement between the institutions, this process merely resulted in the adoption of the 
Common Approach, which is not the product of a genuinely common understanding on 
agencies and agencification. These fundamental issues related to agencification will now 
resurface with greater intensity. 
                                                     
188 On the new—more permissive—delegation doctrine resulting from Short-selling, see Miroslava Scholten & 
Marloes Van Rijsbergen, The Limits of Agencification in the European Union, 15 GERMAN L.J. 1223, 1249 (2014).  
189 European Commission, European Governance - A White Paper, at 24, COM (2001) 428 final (Mar. 29, 2016). 
